THEORETICAL REFLEXION ABOUT THE DISABLED BODY’S SPACE IN THE LAW

Abstract

In this paper we intend to offer a theoretical reflection on Disabled People who do not perform it socially, but to whom the law grants this status and the respective fundamental rights that accompany it. Thus, we want to think precisely about the relationship between these two objects: the law and the performance of (non) disability within this paradoxical interconnection. We will try to understand how this non-disability-law-disability transit operates through the analysis of the speeches of two interlocutors we interviewed: Ártemis and Nêmesis. Both are people who, on the one hand, do not recognize themselves as disabled, and, on the other, they used legal instruments that enabled them to navigate the disability-non-disability border to exercise their fundamental rights. We will start with two brief theoretical reflections that mark the perspective adopted as a reference: crip theory and the legal consciousness. In the second part of the text, we will use these keys and theoretical perspectives to understand the complex metamorphosis that lies in the narration of (non) disability and the fundamental role, to some extent, played by law and legal institutions in this process of subjectivation.